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Calvinist Absolutism: Archbishop James Ussher and Royal Power 
 
Since the publication of Michael Walzer’s Revolution of the Saints and Quentin Skinner’s 
influential revision of Walzer’s arguments, historians of Britain and Ireland have most often 
conjoined Calvinism (or Reformed Orthodoxy) with the political theories of limited 
monarchy, resistance, and revolution.1 Walzer argued that the theory of revolution espoused 
by mid-seventeenth-century Puritans arose out of a distinctively Reformed theology; Skinner 
preferred to trace Calvinist revolutionary theory to late medieval scholasticism. But whatever 
its sources, both agreed (in the manner of Max Weber or Ernst Troeltsch) that this radical 
Calvinist theory played a vital role in the emergence of European modernity, in the form 
either of a new individualism and affinity for revolution or a new secular and impersonal 
theory of the state.2 John Coffey’s study of the Scottish Covenanter Samuel Rutherford 
steered a middle course between Skinner and Walzer, acknowledging Rutherford’s medieval 
                                                          
1 For “Calvinism” see Christoph Strohm, “Methodology in Discussion of ‘Calvin and 
Calvinism,’” in Calvinus Praeceptor Ecclesiae, ed. Herman Selderhuis (Geneva, 2004), 65-
106. 
2 Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics 
(Cambridge, MA, 1965); Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought 2 
vols. (Cambridge, 1978), 2: 190-348, 349-58; Ernst Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress: 
The Significance of Protestantism for the Rise of the Modern World (London, 1912); Mark 
Goldie, “The Context of The Foundations,” in Rethinking the Foundations of Modern 
Political Thought, ed. Annabel Brett and James Tully (Cambridge, 2006), 3-19. 
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debts while insisting on the transformative capacity of radical Calvinism.3 A leading German 
scholar of Calvinist political thought, Christoph Strohm, has explained the practical element 
to this Reformed anti-absolutism: the German emperor was a Catholic, and so imperial 
absolutism posed an existential threat to Germany’s Calvinist theologians, whose influence 
extended across Europe.4 But Calvinists were not inevitably committed to non-absolutist 
politics: Heinz Schilling and Bodo Nischan pointed out alliances between Calvinism and 
absolutism in the county of Lippe and the electorate of Brandenburg.5 To the distinguished 
Calvinist absolutists noticed by Schilling and Nischan, this article will add Archbishop James 
Ussher of Armagh, primate of all Ireland between 1625 and his death in 1656. 
Due to the character of the division between revisionist and post-revisionist British 
scholarship on the English Civil War, a study of the nature and development of Ussher’s 
political thought will enrich our knowledge of both Calvinism and absolutism in Britain and 
Ireland. Peter Lake and Johann Sommerville have usefully defined an absolutist political 
                                                          
3 John Coffey, Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel 
Rutherford (Cambridge, 1997), 142, 152-3, 181-3. 
4 Christoph Strohm, Calvinismus und Recht: Weltanshaulich-konfessionelle Aspekte im 
Werk reformierter Juristen in der Frühen Neuzeit (Tübingen, 2008), 231-245, 396-406, 
especially 405. 
5 Heinz Schilling, “Between the Territorial State and Urban Liberty: Lutheranism and 
Calvinism in the County of Lippe,” in The German People and the Reformation, ed. R. Po-
Chia Hsia (Ithaca, NY, 1988), 263-83, at 267; Bodo Nischan, “Calvinism, the Thirty Years’ 
War, and the Beginning of Absolutism in Brandenburg: The Political Thought of John 
Bergius,” and “Confessionalism and Absolutism: The Case of Brandenburg,” in idem, 
Lutherans and Calvinists in the Age of Confessionalism (Aldershot, 1999), items IX and X. 
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theory as one in which the ruler’s power was granted directly by God, whether or not the 
ruler had been designated by the people. While the ruler might chose to respect human laws 
and chose to take counsel, he or she was free to override those laws (common law or civil 
law, criminal law or the law of property) or that counsel whenever he or she judged it 
necessary. Although the ruler was thus free (independent or absolute) from all human law, he 
or she remained bound by natural law; only God could punish breaches of this natural law. If 
an absolute monarch began to act tyrannically, that monarch’s subjects had just recourse only 
to prayers and tears.6 Whiggish accounts of the English Civil War as an episode in the 
unfolding of English freedom had argued that Stuart absolutist theory was a significant cause 
of war; revisionist historians led by Conrad Russell denied this.7 Glenn Burgess reinforced 
Russell’s argument that there were almost no absolutists in England before the civil war.8 
Revisionist scholarship tended to shift emphasis from constitutional to religious causes of 
war: indeed John Morrill argued convincingly that it was a religious war in that religion 
drove militant minorities to fight, and drove the moderate majority to make reluctant 
choices.9  
                                                          
6 Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from 
Whitgift to Hooker (London, 1988), 7; Johann Sommerville, Royalists & Patriots: Politics 
and Ideology in England 1603-1640 (2nd edn, London, 1999), 9-54, 234-5. 
7 Nicholas Tyacke, “Introduction,” in The English Revolution c. 1590-1720, ed. idem 
(Manchester, 2007), 1-26; Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford, 
1990), 131-2, 149-50, 151-2.  
8 Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven, 1996), 210-
11. 
9 John Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution (London, 1993), 36-7, 43-4.  
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Absolutist political theory was certainly not a cause of war in itself; but revisionist 
arguments on the non-existence of British and Irish absolutists went too far. Russell, Burgess, 
and Perez Zagorin all pointed out that although many theorists stated that the king was free 
from human laws, few before 1642 went on to argue openly that the king should make law 
without parliament. This was true; but Russell and Burgess then wrote that as only the latter 
were truly absolutists, absolutism was an ideology of no importance in the Stuart kingdoms 
before 1642.10 Sommerville has comprehensively refuted this argument, on the basis that 
many contemporaries identified a lack of royal limitation by human law as intolerable, 
arbitrary, and absolute, and on a practical level were thus deeply alarmed by the thought that 
Charles I should, for example, be able to impose customs duties at will.11 Sommerville’s 
position on the reality of English absolutism has been reinforced by Cesare Cuttica’s study of 
Sir Robert Filmer, which contextualized Filmer’s absolutist political theory amid discourses 
of limited monarchy in Kent in the 1620s.12 According to the revisionists these theorists of 
limited monarchy or just resistance were also non-existent in England before the civil war. 
This claim has been undermined by Sommerville and Cuttica, by Richard Cust’s research into 
discourses of patriotism among those who opposed the royal court, by Skinner’s emphasis on 
                                                          
10 Russell, Causes, 150; Burgess, Absolute Monarchy, 43; idem,  Perez Zagorin, A History of 
Political Thought in the English Revolution (Bristol, 1997), 189-90. 
11 Sommerville, Royalists & Patriots, 228-50; idem, “Ideology, Property, and the 
Constitution,” in Conflict in Early Stuart England, ed. Richard Cust and Ann Hughes 
(London, 1989), 47-71; Derek Hirst, “The Place of Principle,” Past & Present 92, (August, 
1981), 79-99. 
12 Cesare Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer (1588-1653) and the Patriotic Monarch (Manchester, 
2012). 
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the potentially explosive consequence of the fact that all university men were educated in a 
classical tradition which equated merely the potential of coercion (perhaps by the royal 
prerogative) with slavery, and by Janelle Greenberg who identified an early Stuart discourse 
of limited monarchy gathered around medieval texts like the Modus tenendi Parliamentum, 
the Mirror of Justices, and the so-called laws of St Edward the Confessor.13 It should also be 
noted that during the 1610s Sir John Davies had defended the supremacy of law made by 
judges in the king’s interest over law made in parliament, while in the 1630s absolutists like 
John Cusacke, Sir Robert Filmer, and Archbishop Ussher tended to redefine parliament so 
that it would be incapable of any action other than swift obedience.14 The fact that, as David 
Smith has explained, many if not most royalists during and after 1642 could favour some 
                                                          
13 Russell, Causes, 131-4; Richard Cust, “‘Patriots’ and ‘Popular’ Spirits: Narratives of 
Conflict in Early Stuart Politics,” in English Revolution, ed. Tyacke, 43-61; Quentin Skinner, 
Visions of Politics: Volume 2 Renaissance Virtues (Cambridge, 2002), 308-343; Janelle 
Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution: St Edward’s ‘Laws’ in Early 
Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 2001). 
14 Hans Pawlisch, Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland: A Study in Legal Imperialism 
(Cambridge, 1985), 34-5; Linda Levy Peck, “Beyond the Pale: John Cusacke and the 
Language of Absolutism in Early Stuart Britain,” Historical Journal 41, no. 1 (March 1998), 
121-149; Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed. J. P. Sommerville 
(Cambridge, 1991), 52, 55-7; James Ussher, The Power Communicated by God to the Prince 
and the Obedience Required of the Subject, ed. Robert Sanderson (London, 1661) [hereafter 
Ussher, Power], 19-28. 
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subtle limitation of the king’s powers by human law is further testimony to the real 
distinction between absolute and limited monarchy.15 
Accepting the religious character of conflict in the Three Kingdoms in the late 1630s 
and 1640s, and accepting the importance of militant minorities in forcing moderates to 
choose sides, an instance of absolutist political theory embedded in the Reformed Orthodox 
or Calvinist political tradition becomes significant. How did one become a Calvinist 
Absolutist? What stresses and strains were involved in adhering to this doctrine? What was 
the character or quality of a specifically Calvinist absolutism? It will be argued below that 
many of the same anxieties which troubled continental Calvinist intellectuals like David 
Pareus or Lambert Daneau also troubled Anglophone Calvinists like Ussher. Sommerville’s 
contention that little separated Catholic and Protestant theories of reason and law is 
incorrect.16 The Protestant absolutist political discourse which appears, on the basis of 
currently available evidence, to have been dominant in Dublin’s viceregal court from 1633 to 
Strafford’s fall was different in fundamentals to the Jesuit-influenced discourse of the Irish 
Catholic revolutionaries. The anthropology was different, and the major points of stress and 
controversy were different: few Irish Catholic intellectuals were worried about the ability of 
human reason to perceive the natural law, and they did not argue about the inferior 
magistrate’s right of execution. 
This article will employ Ussher’s manuscript notebooks in conjunction with his 
printed writings to describe his formation as a Calvinist absolutist, providing both an 
intellectual context in international Calvinism for his theory of human society, and an account 
                                                          
15 David Smith, Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c. 1640-1649 
(Cambridge, 1994). 
16 Sommerville, Royalists & Patriots, 17-18.  
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of the development of his theory of royal power from the 1620s to the 1640s. Ussher was not 
unique in being a Calvinist bishop and absolutist: Sommerville has characterized Thomas 
Morton, bishop of Durham, in this way, although Morton’s theory was not at all as learned or 
extensive as Ussher’s.17 Following a preliminary characterization of both Ussher’s Calvinism 
and his absolutism, the connections between Ussher’s mature absolutism and his ethical and 
political education at Trinity College Dublin in the 1590s will be examined. The second 
section of the argument will relate Ussher’s absolutism to Calvinist resistance theory and to 
the revolutionary theory of his Catholic enemies. Finally, although this article chiefly 
analyzes Ussher’s formation as a Calvinist absolutist and the character of his absolutism, a 
remarkable treatise by one of Wentworth’s servants enables an estimate of the relationship 
between Ussher’s Calvinist absolutism and the vice-regal court.  
There can be no doubt about the nature of James Ussher’s theological commitments. 
As Jack Cunningham has recently explained, the archbishop consistently emphasized the 
nothingness of humankind, the fundamental damage done to all human capacities by original 
sin, and the utter dependence of humans on God’s grace for salvation. Ussher carefully 
defended those vital components of Reformed orthodoxy, supralapsarian determinism and 
double predestination. Respectively, these doctrines meant that before God created the world 
he had already declared who would be elect, the minority chosen for salvation; and that God 
had also declared that a majority would be damned.18 Ussher hammered at these themes 
through his long preaching life before two Stuart kings and the nobility and gentry of Ireland 
                                                          
17 Ibid, 49; Thomas Morton, A Sermon Preached Before the kings Most Excellent Majestie in 
the Cathedrall Church of Durham (London, 1639). 
18 Jack Cunningham, James Ussher and John Bramhall: The Theology and Politics of Two 
Irish Ecclesiastics of the Seventeenth Century (Aldershot, 2007), 42, 47, 52-3, 55.  
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and England; they are summed up conveniently in a catechism printed in 1644 but composed 
while he was in his twenties.19 Even relatively early in his career Ussher was keen to 
institutionalize this theology. Alan Ford has argued that Ussher was prominent among those 
who wrote Irish Protestantism’s first national confession, the 1615 articles, which committed 
the Church of Ireland to supralapsarian determinism and double predestination as well as 
other Calvinist staples like fasting, sabbatarianism, and the identification of the pope as anti-
Christ.20 Ussher was not unique as a determined Calvinist among the early Stuart episcopate: 
Hugh Trevor-Roper included George Abbott, archbishop of Canterbury, John Williams, 
bishop of Lincoln, John Davenant, bishop of Salisbury, and Bishop Morton among that 
number. But Trevor-Roper also insisted that Ussher was the most distinguished of them all: 
“the acknowledged leader of all those Jacobean clergy who, in the reign of Charles I, found 
themselves suddenly excluded, or extruded, from authority.”21 
The doctrinal core of Ussher’s absolutism is also unambiguous, although the nature of 
its publication is more complex. Writing in 1661, Ussher’s former chaplain Nicolas Bernard 
explained that during the summer of 1639, when the Scots under their National Covenant 
                                                          
19 James Ussher, The Principles of Christian Religion (London, 1644). 
20 Articles of Religion agreed upon by the Archbishops and Bishops, and the rest of the 
Cleargie of Ireland in the Convocation Holden at Dublin in the Yeare of our Lord God 1615 
(Dublin, 1615); Alan Ford, James Ussher: Theology, History, and Politics in early modern 
Ireland and England (Oxford, 2007), 85-99. 
21 Hugh Trevor-Roper, Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans (London, 1987), 50-1, 150, 164, 
253. For Ussher’s association with lay Calvinist episcopalians like Francis Russell, earl of 
Bedford, in 1640-41, see Conrad Russell, The Fall of the British Monarchies 1637-1642 
(Oxford, 1991), 238-40, 249. 
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were successfully resisting King Charles I’s religious innovations, he was contacted by Sir 
George Radcliffe, privy counselor and legal expert to the lord deputy. Radcliffe requested 
that Ussher, then in his diocese, provide a statement on the injustice of Scottish resistance; 
this was about the same time that the Irish privy council moved most of the army to the north-
east and commanded all adult Scots in Ulster to swear an oath abjuring the Covenant.22 It was 
presumably at this time also that Radcliffe sent Ussher his own treatise on royal power “Of 
the originall of Government.”23 In any case, the archbishop complied with Radcliffe’s request 
immediately. Later that year or early in 1640 when Ussher came to Dublin, he was asked by 
Wentworth (created earl of Strafford in January 1640) to preach in Christchurch cathedral on 
the same subject. Ussher again complied, and gave his two sermons at the opening of the 
Irish parliament on 16 March 1640.24 Pleased by their content, Strafford told Ussher that it 
was his desire and the king’s that the sermons be published in some form. It was then that 
Ussher wrote his most substantial political work, The Power Communicated by God to the 
                                                          
22 Aidan Clarke, “The Government of Wentworth, 1632-40,” in A New History of Ireland, 
vol. 3, Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691, ed. T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byrne 
(Oxford, 1978), 243-269, at 268. 
23 Ford, Ussher, 225; MS F 119, fols. 366v, 365r, 265v, property of Mr Rory McLaggan, 
Merthyr Mawr House, Bridgend, Mid Glamorgan, Wales. Radcliffe’s treatise is reversed; 
available on microfilm MIC 135, Trinity College Dublin [hereafter TCD]. I have obtained Mr 
McLaggan’s permission shortly to publish this treatise in Irish Historical Studies. 
24 Strafford was initially absent, see The Journals of the House of Commons of the Kingdom 
of Ireland ... Volume I (Dublin, 1796), 61-2, 133-7; Nicholas Bernard, The Life & Death of 
the Most Reverend and Learned Father of our Church, Dr James Ussher (Dublin, 1656), 104. 
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Prince, bringing it with him to England in May 1640 for presentation to the king.25 The book 
then disappeared perhaps because both Ussher and the king’s other servants felt that the 
archbishop would be more use to the king’s cause by presenting himself in public as a 
Calvinist episcopalian rather than as a Calvinist absolutist.26 At the Restoration, Ussher’s 
grandson, Sir James Tyrrell, brought a text to Robert Sanderson, bishop of Lincoln, who saw 
to its publication.27   
Reviewing all this, one might suspect that Ussher adopted the theory of absolute 
monarchy only under pressure from the king and his servants. Bernard was anxious to dispel 
such suspicions. He insisted that Ussher had preached the same political doctrine for many 
years, not only annually on the day of the king’s inauguration, but also at the openings of the 
Irish parliaments of 1634 and 1640, at Dublin Castle in 1622, before Lord Deputy Henry 
Carey, viscount Falkland, at Dublin Castle in 1627, on the king’s birthday in 1630, and then 
later in England during the civil war.28 Several of these sermons survive, and confirm 
                                                          
25 Nicholas Bernard, Clavi Trabales (London, 1661), 47-8. 
26 Cunningham, James Ussher and John Bramhall, 112-3; Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule 
of Charles I (London, 1995), 935; Ford, Ussher, 230, 235-40. There is no space here for a 
treatment of Ussher’s ecclesiology and the matter of royal power over the church, but note 
that Ussher did not believe bishops possessed a ius divinum, see Ford, Ussher, 46-7, 208-9, 
235-60. 
27 Ussher, Power, sigs. A1r-E2v; Ford, Ussher, pp. 224-5. 
28 Bernard, Clavi Trabales, 48-9. For the 22 November 1622 and April 1627 sermons, see 
Bernard, Clavi Trabales, 1-35 [recte 46]. For a sermon on Romans 13:4, ‘For he beareth not 
the sword in vain’ at Falkland’s inauguration, September 1622, see MS Rawlinson, C. 919, p. 
583, Bodleian Library, Oxford [hereafter Bodl.] 
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Bernard’s claims. In particular, Ussher’s sermon delivered on 14 July 1634, the first day of 
Wentworth’s first Irish parliament, anticipated The Power Communicated by God to the 
Prince, including the crucial argument that royal power must be ‘uncontrollable power’ or no 
government was possible.29 Another sermon given at Oxford on 3 March 1643 summarized 
Ussher’s (yet unprinted) book on royal authority.30 Certainly by early 1640 Ussher was 
arguing that God had ordained that the king’s power should be free of the control of human 
laws and parliaments; this absolute monarchy was the best form of government, and the 
Stuart kings ruled as just such absolute monarchs. Even monarchs who commanded devil-
worship, Ussher insisted, were to be honored and could not be actively resisted. Such 
resistance would earn eternal damnation.31 Moreover, the Stuarts’ hereditary right was 
indefeasible: succession to monarchy was regulated by the law of primogeniture and could 
never be forfeited.32 Neither Cunningham nor Ford hesitated to label Ussher’s theory of 
government absolutist.33 Ussher’s absolutist political theory, conveniently cloaked in 1640, 
was not merely a response to royal pressure: it developed gradually and its roots must be 
sought earlier in his intellectual development. 
 
Ussher’s Calvinist Education in Ethics and Politics 
                                                          
29 MS Rawlinson D 1290, fols. 73v-78r, at 76v, Bodl; cf Ford, Ussher, 224-5. 
30 James Ussher, The Soveraignes Power, and the Subiects Duty: Delivered in a Sermon, at 
Christ-Church in Oxford, March 3. 1643 (Oxford, 1643); idem, The Rights of Primogeniture: 
or, the Excellency of Royall Authority (London, 1648).  
31 Ussher, Power, 1-3, 24-8, 54-5, 60, 71, 135, 145-6, 150-3. 
32 Ussher, Power, 10-11; idem, The Rights of Primogeniture, passim. 
33 Cunningham, James Ussher and John Bramhall, 119-128; Ford, Ussher, 225-6, 261, 270. 
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In Trinity College Dublin during the 1590s James Ussher was taught an Aristotelian theory of 
human society and government. Ussher completed his four year B.A. probably in 1598 and 
his two-year M.A. by 1600.34  From Ussher’s student notebooks, it seems probable that his 
study in the 1590s followed that later prescribed in the Trinity statutes of 1615 and 1628, in 
which Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics were assigned for the B.A. and Aristotle’s Politics for 
the M.A.35 One of these notebooks contains a study scheme for the Ethics, starting in 
December with book two and finishing the following September with book ten. The same 
notebook contains a diagram outlining the Politics.36 Another notebook contains notes on a 
complete course of Aristotelian ethics, starting with diagrams outlining the Nicomachean 
Ethics and Cicero’s De Officiis (On Duties).37 
The theory of human society contained in the Ethics and Politics can be outlined 
briefly. Humans, Aristotle argued, should during the course of their lives, aim at eudaimonia, 
happiness or flourishing.38 Because humans were distinguished from animals by logos (one 
word meaning both reason and speech), and each creature should strive to satisfy what was 
best in it, humans would reach that state of eudaimonia when they used their reason 
excellently, virtuously, to the utmost.39 It was in political life (rather than say, domestic life) 
                                                          
34 Ford, Ussher, 32. 
35 Elizabethanne Boran, “Libraries and Learning: The Early History of Trinity College, 
Dublin from 1592-1641” PhD diss., University of Dublin, 1995, 188.  
36 MS 782, fols. 9v, 16r, TCD. 
37 MS 778, fols. 136r-210r, TCD. 
38 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b-1098a. 
39 Ibid., 1177a, 1178a-1179a. 
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that humans use their reason to the utmost, governing each in turn and reasoning with one 
another, and so political life was both natural to humans and the best life for humans.40 In a 
moment of suggestive exaggeration, the radical absolutist Thomas Hobbes labelled such 
Aristotelian eudaimonic theories, which tended to conflate a lack of self-directing political 
life with slavery, an important cause of civil war.41 
Ussher’s student notebooks provide ample evidence of his comprehension of this 
eudaimonic politics. One notebook contains a Latin oration in praise of Aristotle dated March 
1598. In it Ussher claimed that the doctrine of living well, developed by Plato and others, 
found its finest expression in Aristotle’s works, and that the essence of human happiness 
(felicitas in Latin) lay in the exercise of virtue or human excellence.42 Another notebook built 
up during the ethics course contained a treatment of the rival Aristotelian ends of political life 
and contemplation, and also definitions of key ethical terms, including eudaimonia.43 Finally, 
Ussher argued publically that Aristotle and Cicero shared the same eudaimonic politics. In 
another of his Latin student orations Ussher, paraphrasing De Officiis 1.50, explained that 
Cicero held that reason and eloquence (ratio et oratio) were humankind’s highest distinctions 
and the principal bonds of human society. By speaking, communicating, and disputing, 
humans used reason and eloquence to join in a society truly natural.44 
                                                          
40 Aristotle, Politics, 1252b-1253a, 1259a, 1279a. 
41 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London, 1651), part 2, chap. 21, pp. 110-111; Skinner, 
Visions of Politics, 308. 
42 MS 786, fols. 85r-86r, TCD. 
43 MS 778, fol. 140r, TCD. 
44 MS 790, fols. 3r-4v, TCD. 
14 
 
Ussher was also familiar with ways of integrating this eudaimonic politics into a 
theory of Christian government. No Christian could allow that humankind’s ultimate end was 
flourishing in this world; rather the ultimate end was God. Thomas Aquinas and other 
theologians had distinguished between a this-worldly felicitas, which humans might achieve 
through their own efforts in roughly the way that Aristotle had described, and a next-
worldly beatitudo (blessedness) which lay in God’s gift alone. Aquinas also developed a 
distinctive theory of the laws which governed relationships both within and between human 
societies. The eternal law was God’s reason as it directed things to their ends. Humans, 
because rational, could direct their own actions to good ends; this human participation in the 
eternal law was natural law. All humans thus perceived that natural law enjoined self-
preservation (forbidding murder), the preservation of the species (forbidding the disruption of 
family life), knowing God and living in political society (forbidding things harmful to the 
commonwealth); any human act or positive law which contravened natural law would be 
wrong and void.45 The young Ussher listed Aquinas as a key authority in ethics, and later in 
life Ussher drew freely from Aquinas.46 Moreover, Ussher maintained a keen interest in the 
writings of Richard Hooker, an Elizabethan Protestant conformist and determined enemy of 
Calvinism (at least with regard to ecclesiology). Ussher had acquired the manuscript of books 
                                                          
45 John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford, 1998), 222-254. For 
eternal law, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. Thomas Gilby (London and New 
York, 1964-1981), Ia IIae, q.  91, a. 1; q. 93, a. 1. For natural law, see ibid., q. 91, a. 2.; q. 93, 
a. 5. For human positive law, see ibid., q. 90, a. 2; q. 96, a. 4. 
46 MS 782, fol. 6, TCD; Ussher, Power, 54-5, 72-3. 
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six and eight of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity and had them printed in 1648.47 Book one 
of the Laws, first printed in 1593, explained that all humans sought a triple perfection: the 
first perfection, to which all animals might attain, lay in securing those material things 
necessary to life; the third perfection was unity with God. But between those two lay 
intellectual perfection, proper to rational human nature, and available in the political life 
which Aristotle had described.48  
Nevertheless, when one turns to the theory of human society employed in The Power 
Communicated by God to the Prince, it is clear that the archbishop had left even the 
Christianized Aristotle of Aquinas and Hooker far behind. God, Ussher wrote, had instituted 
political power among humans. God told Eve that her husband Adam ‘shall rule over thee’ 
(Genesis 3:16); and then as families multiplied, God said to Cain in similar terms ‘thou shalt 
rule over him’ (Genesis 4:7). God thus instituted ‘a principality in one man over divers 
Families and thereby laid the foundation of political government’.49 However, even if God 
had not done this, reason itself would have instructed humans to join their families together 
into one political society under the government of a superior, in order to escape the ruin that 
would certainly otherwise ensue. Ussher supported this argument with the words of Rabbi 
Hananiah from the Abot in the Misnah (a second century A.D. Jewish law code): “Pray for 
the peace (or prosperity) of the kingdom; for if it were not for fear of Authority every one 
                                                          
47 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie; the Sixth and Eighth Books 
(London, 1648), sig. A2r-A2v. 
48 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie (London, [1593]), book 1, section 
11, p. 80. 
49 Ussher, Power, 11. 
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would swallow down quick his neighbour.”50 This was an explication, thought Ussher, of 
God’s injunction to the exiled Jews that they should seek the peace of the city in which they 
were captive, for in its peace they would find their own peace (Jeremiah 29:7). 
Ussher thus turned towards a Hebrew political tradition that saw political life as a 
matter of domination rather than human flourishing; and he joined this with a purposeful 
misreading of Aristotle. It was a central pillar of Aristotle’s politics that the total power 
exercised by an adult male over his domestic inferiors (women, children, slaves) was entirely 
different to political power; true human flourishing was found in public negotiation and 
contest with equals.51 However, it was important for Ussher that domestic and political power 
should seem the same thing, so that obedience should be the chief action available to subjects 
in the political sphere. Thus, he carefully sought out those phrases in Aristotle’s Ethics 
and Politics which, if utterly divorced from their context, might imply that fatherly and royal 
power were the same.52 Ussher shared this anti-Aristotelian patriarchalism with Sir Robert 
Filmer (whose Patriarcha was probably completed about 1630) and many other absolutists.53 
Ussher also discarded the Thomist way of speaking about natural law. Natural law did exist, 
was accessible to human reason, and bound all humans including kings, but Ussher was not 
certain whether natural law had been “written in the hearts of men” as St Paul put it (Romans 
                                                          
50 Ussher, Power, 11-12; Jacob Neusner (ed.), The Mishnah: A New Translation (New 
Haven, 1988), Abot, 3.2, p. 678. 
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7:14-15), or delivered directly by God to humankind in the Ten Commandments, or “by just 
consequence deduced from the grounds of either of them.”54 
Ussher’s student notebooks indicate a range of possible sources for this un-
eudaimonic political vision. One notebook contains a list of authorities taught in various 
ethics classes during his B.A. Aquinas is on that list, but so are John Duns Scotus, John 
Buridan, Peter Martyr Vermigli, William Temple, and Lambert Daneau.55 Scotus is 
especially important here: the thirteenth-fourteenth century Franciscan theologian believed 
that all eudaimonic ethical and political theories were useless to Christians.56 The Franciscan 
argued that a moral action was a free action for which one was responsible and might be 
justly punished or rewarded, but if that action was purely the result of a natural disposition, 
which impelled one towards an end, then it was not free and therefore not moral.57 Against 
Aristotle and Aquinas who believed the will was aimed at naturally impressed ends, Scotus’s 
account of virtue (human excellence) emphasized the free power of the will informed by right 
reason. Scotus’s account of natural law was also very different. Scotus ignored Aquinas’s 
eternal law and any talk of the agent’s end-directed nature and began with the Ten 
Commandments or Decalogue (Exodus 20:2-17). The first table, which comprised the first 
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two commandments (“thou shalt have no other Gods before me,” “thou shalt not take the 
name of the Lord thy God in vain”) and possibly the third (“remember the sabbath day”), 
belonged to the natural law in the strict sense because these commandments were principles 
“nota ex terminis,” known on the basis of the concepts used in formulating them, or because 
they followed necessarily from such self-evident principles.58 The second table of the 
Decalogue belonged to natural law in a looser sense, because its commandments accorded 
with the first table commandments but their opposites would not (for example, “thou shalt not 
kill”). Other divine commands might accord with the first table, but so might their opposites 
(for example, the laws on sacrifice in the Old Testament), and so they were part of divine 
positive law but not natural law.59 
All of these arguments were available in Scotus’s commentary on Peter 
Lombard’s Sentences which was easily accessible to Ussher and his teachers, not least in 
printings edited by the Irish Franciscan Maurice O’Fihely.60 Ussher thought Scotus himself 
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was Irish.61 But as Bonnie Kent has established, this Scotist-inflected hostility to eudaimonic 
ethics was widespread, having been promoted in the very popular commentary on 
the Nicomachean Ethics by John Buridan (a fourteenth-century philosopher and another of 
the young Ussher’s key authorities in ethics), which was reprinted at Oxford as late as 
1637.62 The Scotist ethical tradition is thus a probable source for the second part of Ussher’s 
reflection on natural law; that such a law might be deduced from the grounds of the 
commandments themselves. This tradition, taught to the young Ussher in the 1590s, is also 
one likely source for the archbishop’s generally un-eudaimonic thinking about human 
society. 
But Ussher’s political thinking was also indebted to those he listed among the ‘more 
recent’ authorities in ethics: Protestants like Peter Martyr Vermigli, William Temple, and 
Lambert Daneau, who believed that human reason itself was gravely compromised by the 
fall.63 Martin Luther distrusted Classical and scholastic philosophy because he believed it 
taught that depraved human reason could oppose evil without the aid of the Holy Spirit. But 
from 1527, confronted by Anabaptists and rioting peasants, Luther’s lieutenant Philip 
Melanchthon argued that while internal, spiritual human actions related to salvation were 
indeed utterly depraved; nevertheless human reason, instructed by philosophy and perceiving 
natural law, could achieve good external, natural actions, such as civil justice and 
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government.64 Against Aristotle and many Catholics, Melanchthon insisted that this 
knowledge of natural law rested on innate ideas. Aristotle had argued in the Posterior 
Analytics that the universal principles of knowledge were not innate, but that the power by 
which this knowledge was attained was innate. This position was supported by both Aquinas 
and Scotus against medieval Augustinians who wished to emphasize the damage done to 
human reason by the fall.65 Melanchthon revived this Augustinian position in 
his Commentarius de Anima of 1540. God, Melanchthon wrote, had placed the basic 
principles of logic, dialectics, arithmetic, ethics, politics, and law directly into each human 
mind; damaged humanity could not have arrived at these principles by their own powers.66 
All of these positions were reflected in Vermigli’s popular theology textbook first printed in 
1571, and Ussher was also taught William Temple’s treatment of whether virtue itself was 
innate.67 Ussher endorsed the separation of human capacities into internal and external, and 
also innate ideas, in an anti-Catholic work printed in 1624. He repeated this endorsement in a 
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sermon delivered in Oxford in 1640.68 This doctrine of innate ideas made it particularly easy 
for Protestants to interpret St Paul’s reference to a natural law written on the hearts even of 
Gentiles (Romans 2:14-15), which caused Ussher’s Catholic contemporaries rather more 
labor.69 
The young Ussher was also taught a ferocious Calvinist critique of this moderate 
Protestant politics from Lambert Daneau’s Ethices Christianae Libri Tres of 1577.70 Daneau, 
a distinguished French student of John Calvin, did not distinguish between internal and 
external human capacities as sharply as the Lutherans, and believed that even the 
postlapsarian human reason relevant to political life was very gravely damaged.71 Calvin 
himself insisted that because the human will was necessitated toward sin any insight which 
humans had into the natural or moral law was due to the continuing grace of God, and 
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especially to the on-going guidance of the Holy Spirit. Humanity’s best chance for 
understanding the moral law lay in the Decalogue, but even the second table of the Decalogue 
(those commandments which regulated human affairs) could not be understood without the 
aid of the Holy Spirit.72 Daneau’s Ethices elaborated these two elements, God’s on-going 
intervention in human affairs in the person of the Holy Spirit, and the dominant place of the 
Decalogue in securing order among Christians, into a distinctively Reformed system of 
ethics. Because humans possessed a will free to sin but not free to do good, the Holy Spirit 
was the source of all human knowledge of the good and the honorable, even among non-
Christians.73 Virtue, human excellence, was not the result of careful education and long 
practice, but rather was the work of the Holy Spirit.74 Both the philosophy of the pagans and 
the theology of the scholastics were likewise useless, because they were based on corrupted 
human reason. Christians should draw their ethics directly from the Decalogue.75 For 
example, Daneau deduced from the second commandment on graven images that inferior 
magistrates like the electors of the Holy Roman Empire were obliged to destroy idols.76 And 
Daneau developed from the fifth commandment (“honour thy father and thy mother”) the 
position that the end of civil power was the conservation of human society in the tranquility 
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necessary for a Godly life. Not only was Aristotle’s eudaimonia excluded from Daneau’s 
politics, even the ability to perceive natural law was now questionable.77 
Ussher remained convinced of the value of classical philosophy, a conviction which 
rested on his faith in the capacity of natural, human reason to pursue the good and the 
honorable in political life, even if he could not subscribe to a fully Aristotelian ethics. This 
conviction was explicit in his major anti-Catholic work of 1624, and also in the sermons he 
gave at Oxford in late 1640. 78 The account of human society in The Power Communicated 
by God to the Prince was thus exceptionally minimalist by Ussher’s standards. The cautious 
attitude to natural law (was it simply innate? Could it only be derived from the Decalogue? 
Could reason deduce it from the grounds of the Decalogue?) which his book adopted seems 
most likely a response to the pressure which Daneau’s critique of classical and scholastic 
ethics exerted on the Reformed throughout Europe. Certainly The Power Communicated by 
God to the Prince was a book addressed to the most severe of Calvinist Covenanters; it aimed 
to win them back to obedience. One might speculate therefore that Ussher purposefully built 
the arguments of this book on a vision of human society congruent with that of the most 
severe Calvinism.  
 
Ussher, Calvinist Resistance Theory, and Catholic Revolution 
 
Conrad Russell has established that the belief of the king’s supporters in the 1640s that royal 
power was divinely ordained and sanctioned did not mark them out from the king’s 
opponents; that all power of government was divine in origin was an entirely normal position 
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among educated Protestants. What mattered was not whether people believed in the king’s 
divine right, “but their views, often shaded and obscure, on the relationship between his 
divine right and other divine rights.”79 This problem is thrown into sharp relief when one 
considers the Calvinist resistance theorists against whom Ussher wrote The Power 
Communicated by God to the Prince. 
The purpose of Ussher’s book was to undermine Scottish resistance to Stuart power, 
but Ussher named no Scottish opponents in his book and did not even mention the National 
Covenant of 1638. Indeed the nature of Ussher’s knowledge of the arguments advanced by 
the Scots since 1638 is unclear. The Covenant itself, drafted by Alexander Henderson and 
Archibald Johnston, had restricted itself to condemning the innovations introduced by 
Charles I’s government; it assumed, but did not attempt to prove, the king’s subordination to 
human law and thus implied that authority to enact and repeal legislation lay with the Scottish 
parliament. Henderson provided the relevant proofs in manuscript as “Instructions for 
Defensive Arms” in 1639, and this document was copied, circulated, and read from the 
pulpits, but not printed until 1642.80 However, it was quoted in full in an anti-Covenant 
pamphlet by John Corbet who fled to Dublin from Scotland in 1639, and he claimed to have 
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seen many manuscript copies of the “Instructions” circulating in Dublin when he arrived.81 If 
that was the case, Ussher had presumably heard the outlines of Covenanter resistance theory 
from avenues other than just his communications with Radcliffe. Henderson’s argument 
(which he stated somewhat obliquely) was that inferior magistrates within a political 
community were duty-bound to defend their subjects from royal tyranny.82 
The only Calvinist resistance theorist named in Ussher’s book was David Pareus, 
theology professor at the University of Heidelberg between 1598 and 1619. He was also 
Ussher’s primary opponent in the 1643 sermon, The Soveraignes Power, and the Subjects 
Duty. Pareus was one of the most prominent Reformed orthodox theologians of the early 
seventeenth century; a far more substantial opponent for Ussher than Henderson or the other 
Covenanters of 1638-40. Moreover, Pareus’s theology was not just widely received in the 
Scottish universities (partly because of his personal links with Scottish theologians) but also a 
mandatory part of their curricula.83 In England, Pareus was notorious. In 1612, a short book 
containing a version of Pareus’s argument that inferior magistrates might resist tyrants (and 
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so the Calvinist Frederick V, Elector Palatine, might resist his Catholic emperor) was 
dedicated by a German printer to King James I.84 A hum of interest surrounded Pareus’s 
political theory in the English universities thereafter, which led to his commentary on St 
Paul’s Epistle to the Romans being burned at Oxford, Cambridge, and St Paul’s Cross in 
London in 1622.85 Ussher’s 1643 sermon briefly mentioned other Calvinist resistance 
theorists (Theodore Beza, George Buchanan, and the author of the Vindiciae contra 
Tyrannos), but Pareus was a prestigious, lucid, and comprehensive primary opponent.86 And 
picking out a dead fellow-scholar as interlocutor meant that Ussher, always sincerely 
concerned for Protestant unity, might hope better to avoid an ugly exchange with 
Covenanters like Alexander Henderson.87 
Ussher and Pareus both agreed that all political power was ordained by God. These 
were St Paul’s words in Romans 13: “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers; for 
there is no power but of God, and the powers that be are ordained of God: whosoever 
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resisteth the power, resisteth the Ordinance of God.”88 But what was this power exactly, and 
what did it mean to say that God had ordained it? Pareus explained this very precisely:  
God first instituted the right of the sword in humankind. Genesis 9:6: ‘Whoso 
sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God 
made he man’. But the shedding of all human blood by a private person is 
forbidden by God: ‘thou shalt not kill’. Therefore, the bloodshed which is 
sanctioned by God is that which might be shed by the magistrate. And thus the 
power of the magistrate has been ordained by God, that is to say, he has the right 
of the sword from God.89 
To put it a different way, all individual humans clearly possessed a right of self-defense. But 
the ius gladii (right of the sword), by which a magistrate might execute a criminal who had 
done that magistrate no personal harm, was clearly a different thing to the right of self-
defense. This right (and by ius Pareus here meant a lawful subjective power, rather than an 
objective right at which a just man might aim, or any kind of law) was the true mark of a 
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magistrate; and it could only have been granted by God.90 Moreover, because Pareus and his 
contemporaries did not distinguish between the inside and outside of the territorial state as 
sharply as state-theorists of the nineteenth century and later, the ius gladii was a right of 
executing criminals and also a right of making war.91 Pareus went on to reinforce this theory 
with historical examples of God instituting and deposing kings (King Saul, King David, King 
Rehoboam, and so on), concluding with the words of Daniel 2:21, God “removeth kings, and 
setteth up kings,” and Ecclesiasticus 10:8, “because of unrighteous dealings, injuries, and 
riches got by deceit, the kingdom is translated from one people to another.”92 Ussher’s The 
Power Communicated by God to the Prince agreed entirely with all these doctrines. Christ 
himself had said to Pilate, Ussher noted, that Pilate’s power could only have come from 
God.93 Nevertheless it was characteristic of the archbishop’s love of irony and the indirect 
that Pareus, “no very great friend to the supreme power of Kings,” was only brought into the 
book’s argument to support the position that St Peter referred to government as the 
“ordinance of man” (1 Peter 2:13) only with regard to the object of government, not with 
regard to its cause.94 
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It was when it came to their doctrine of the right of inferior magistrates to resist that 
Ussher relationship with his Reformed colleagues became more complex. The printed version 
of Ussher’s 1643 sermon, The Soveraignes Power, and the Subjects Duty, contained 
abbreviated translations of all of Pareus’s most controversial conclusions on civil 
government.95 Inferior magistrates, Pareus wrote, might lawfully defend themselves, the 
commonwealth, the Church, and true religion, against the superior magistrate; and even 
private subjects, if threatened by a tyrant and if they could neither appeal to any established 
power nor flee, could lawfully defend themselves and their families from that pressing 
danger, as if from a private robber.96 Pareus justified the resistance of lesser magistrates by 
arguing that superior magistrates were subject not only to divine laws but also to the human 
laws of their commonwealths; Deuteronomy 17:18-19 commanded the king to keep divine 
law, and Genesis 9:6, which prescribed the death penalty for murder, applied to tyrants just as 
much as robbers. Moreover, Pareus continued, the inferior magistrate no less than the 
superior was charged by God with the sword to defend the life and health of his subjects from 
atrocious injury inflicted by tyrants: superior and inferior magistrates were socii 
gubernationis, partners in government. The obvious text to cite in support of this argument, 
though curiously omitted by Pareus, was 1 Peter 2:13-14, which, after demanding submission 
to divinely sanctioned authority, continued ‘whether it be to the king, as supreme; Or unto 
governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers’. This text thus 
distinguished between the king and his magistrates, but implied that both ruled by God’s 
ordinance. In any case, Pareus made it clear that these lesser magistrates too were entrusted 
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with the ius gladii.97 As for the lawfulness of private resistance to extreme tyranny, it seemed 
absurd to Pareus that Biblical injunctions to obedience should be understood to mean that the 
very destruction of societas humana, human society itself, must be endured without 
resistance.98 
Ussher’s position on the lesser magistrates argument derived from 1 Peter 2:13-14 
took time to harden. When speaking on 1 September 1622 at the inauguration of Falkland as 
lord deputy, Ussher first distinguished civil from ecclesiastical power, and then explained that 
according to St Peter the civil officer was either supreme or subordinate. Lords deputy were 
just such subordinate officers, Ussher wrote in his preliminary notes, “who receive Gods 
sword, as well as the kings.” 99 In 1622 then, Ussher seems to have believed that lesser 
magistrates received their ius gladii not just by delegation from the king, but also directly 
from God: this is significant because for Pareus and the Reformed Orthodox tradition 
generally such an independent ius gladii included the obligation to defend one’s subordinates 
from tyranny. Writing in 1639-40, Ussher had not entirely discarded that view. He suggested 
that St Peter’s distinction between the king (basileus) and the governors (hegemones) should 
be understood to be the same that the orator Dio Chrysostom made between magistracy 
(arkhe) and regality (basileia); the former was “a legal administration of men according to the 
Law,” whereas the latter was “such a government as is not subject to the controll of any.” 
And the law, as Chrysostom put it, was simply “the decree of the king.”100 From all this, one 
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might expect Ussher to conclude that St Peter meant that the power of inferior magistrates 
was mediated through the superior magistrates and did not come directly from God. But the 
archbishop did not spell this out. Much later he admitted that Gregory Nazianzen, St 
Augustine, and Epiphanius of Salamis all clearly believed that these lesser magistrates had 
indeed received the ius gladii from God, even though they were still subordinate to their 
superiors.101 Ussher finally clarified his position on divine power and the inferior magistrate 
in the sermon he delivered before the king in 1643. The king’s power came immediately from 
God, and the lesser magistrates also derived their power from God, but in a mediated manner 
through the king. Ussher did indeed see Britain and Ireland as, in Russell’s words, “a 
patchwork of divine rights.”102  
While Ussher’s thinking on divine power and the inferior magistrate was developing, 
he resorted to a different branch of political philosophy to neutralize the inferior magistrate’s 
power.103 When speaking at the opening of Wentworth’s parliament in 1634, Ussher 
explained to those assembled that there had to be a supreme and uncontrollable power located 
within every government, a power from which there could be no appeal; if there was no such 
power then there was no government. Ussher’s example of what such anarchy looked like 
came from Judges 21:26: “In those dayes there was no King in Israel: every man did that 
which was right in his owne eyes.”104 This was despite the fact, Ussher said, that there were 
still inferior magistrates in Israel, as the same chapter mentioned the “Elders of the 
Congregation” (Judges 21:16), and the previous chapter stated that Phineas remained the high 
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priest before the ark (Judges 20:28). A supremacy of power from which there could be no 
appeal, Ussher went on, was essential to all government, and the formal differences between 
kinds of government were determined from its location. So the Swiss cantons, he explained, 
which were governed by magistrates might look like aristocracies but in fact were 
democracies deriving their authority from the people and ultimately answerable to them. As 
Ussher adduced further examples from Venice and Sparta, it became clear that he believed 
that any government that was not an absolute monarchy might as well have been anarchy.105 
Although the archbishop did not cite Jean Bodin either here or in his printed work, this 
distinctive line of argument was probably borrowed either from Bodin’s Methodus ad facilem 
historiarum cognitionem of 1566 or the Six livres de la république of 1576, which had 
become well-known in Ireland through the work of Sir John Davies, the former attorney 
general.106 Finally Ussher reached his point: 
And although in this great and honourable assemblye, the Knights and Burgesses 
representing the whole body of the Commons bear the shew of a little Democratie 
among us and the Lords and Nobles as the Optimates of the kingdome, of an 
Aristocratie: yet are we not therfore to imagine, that ours is a mixt government, 
but an absolute monarchye: because the supreme authoritye resteth neither in the 
one nor in the other, either severallye or jointlye, but solelye in the person of the 
Soveraigne, by whose power they are both assembled and dissolved, and all their 
acts at his pleasure either allowed or disallowed. Whereupon by consent of all the 
States aswell of this kingdome as of the other, the oathe of Supremacy as framed: 
                                                          
105 Ibid. 
106 Ian Campbell, ‘Aristotelian Ancient Constitution and Anti-Aristotelian Sovereignty in 
Stuart Ireland’, Historical Journal, 53, no. 3 (September 2010): 573-591. 
33 
 
wherein the Kings highness is acknowledged to be the only supreme governour of 
his dominions in all causes whatsoever.107 
This was a sermon which the lord deputy afterwards commended as ‘very excellent and 
learned’.108 Ussher clearly felt these arguments were sound, as he repeated them almost 
exactly in The Power Communicated by God to the Prince; he probably argued similarly in 
his sermon before the Irish Parliament of 1640, as his book was apparently based on this 
sermon.109 John Salmon wrote that Ussher believed the king supreme over mutable law only, 
which might imply that the king was not empowered to change the fundamental laws 
constitutive of the kingdom.110 But by mutable laws Ussher meant all human positive laws; 
immutable law was natural law which never altered (unless altered by God) and to which the 
king was always subject (although punishable only by God).111 Ussher stated bluntly that 
subjects were obliged to obey even tyrants who altered “the whole frame of the Common-
wealth.”112 It is a measure of the strength of Ussher’s absolutism that Ussher’s endorsement 
of Bodin’s sovereignty theory should be so unreserved; his fellow Calvinists in Germany 
were generally much more cautious.113 
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Ussher’s conviction that royal power had by definition to be unlimited, whether by 
parliament or any other human institution, placed him in the mainstream of pre-war Stuart 
absolutism, along with writers of substantial treatises like the cleric Hadrian Saravia, King 
James I and VI, Sir John Davies (attorney general for Ireland), Alberico Gentili and John 
Cowell (regius professors of civil law at Oxford and Cambridge), Sir Francis Kynaston 
(esquire of the body to Charles I), the projector John Cusacke, Peter Heylin (royal chaplain 
and associate of Laud), Sir Robert Filmer, and, as will be argued below, Strafford’s servant 
Sir George Radcliffe.114 Thomas Hobbes was also an absolutist of a kind, but due to his 
unorthodox Christianity he is better treated as sui generis. Ussher added to this basic position 
an anti-Aristotelian patriarchalism which he shared with at least Saravia, Filmer, and 
Radcliffe. The determined anti-Aristotelianism which Ussher and Filmer, in particular, held 
in common (but independently) is remarkable: it is very prominent in Filmer’s Patriarchia, 
composed in the late 1620s and early 1630s, and in the Observations upon Aristotles 
Politiques of 1652.115 
                                                          
114 On Saravia, see Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? pp. 135-139. On King James, Gentili, and 
Cowell, see J. H. M. Salmon, “Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontanism, and the Royalist 
Response, 1580-1620,” in The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed. J. H. 
Burns (Cambridge, 1991), 219-253, at 247-249. On Cusacke, Peck, “Beyond the Pale.” On 
Kynaston, Heylin, and Davies, see Sommerville, Patriots & Royalists, 235-238, 240-244, 
245-249. 
115 Sir Robert Filmer, Obervations upon Aristotles Politiques (London, 1652).  However, for 
the claim that Filmer’s theory was more secular than that of other Stuart absolutists, see 
Cuttica, Filmer, 154, 160. 
35 
 
Patriarchia ascribed to both Jesuits and Calvinists the doctrine that God granted power 
to kings via the people, who might justly limit their king’s power.116 Ussher did not lump 
Jesuits and Calvinists or Covenanters together in this way, despite expert, first-hand 
knowledge of the basically Jesuit theory of revolution advanced by radical Irish Catholics. 
This ideology and the institutions which propagated it were established in the Spanish empire 
by the generation of Irish Catholics who left Ireland after the conclusion of the Nine Years 
War in 1603.117 Philip O’Sullivan Beare and his successors developed the ideology’s main 
line in a series of printed books, manuscript position papers, and manuscript histories 
published between the 1610s and the 1660s. The heart of this tradition was the contention that 
the kingdom of Ireland was a valid political community which possessed the power to defend 
itself against destruction, just as an individual might. To govern the commonwealth for the 
good of a narrow, Protestant faction alone was attempt its destruction. The Catholics of 
Ireland were thus empowered to defend their commonwealth, with or without the pope’s 
consent, and force their king onto a just course; some authors went on to state openly that the 
Irish might replace their king with another.  Jesuit-educated writers like O’Sullivan Beare 
assumed that the natural law was easily accessible to human reason, and that there was a kind 
of political flourishing that humans could hope to attain. The inferior magistrate went 
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unmentioned.118 Ussher’s notebooks contain multiple sets of notes on O’Sullivan Beare’s 
seminal version of this theory.119 Moreover, when Ussher spoke before Lord Deputy Falkland 
at Dublin Castle in April 1627 it was O’Sullivan Beare’s revolutionary theory he chose to 
emphasize in order to attack the efforts of the Catholic elite to secure toleration in exchange 
for financial subsidy.120  It seems clear then that Ussher had long been convinced that Stuart 
royal power had to remain free from whatever legal or parliamentary obstruction that even 
the more moderate kind of Irish Catholics might still be capable of effecting. In the late 1630s 
this on-going Catholic threat was joined by a Scottish rebellion which gravely endangered 
episcopacy throughout the Stuart kingdoms; but The Power Communicated by God to the 
Prince addressed the Covenanters alone, and Ussher never confused his two sets of 
antagonists.  
 
Ussher’s Absolutism and the Viceregal Court 
 
Historians of seventeenth-century Ireland have long regarded the contention that Thomas 
Wentworth’s program of government was an absolutist one as uncontroversial. The lord 
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deputy clearly meant to free royal power in Ireland from the guidance and restraint of the 
local elites, of the Irish parliament, and of the English common law. Both Hugh Kearney and 
Aidan Clarke argued that Wentworth demonstrated a ruthless disregard for the common law 
as it was traditionally employed in Ireland while seeking to recover church land, and he 
extended the policy of confiscation and colonization from Irish Ireland to those parts of 
Ireland where estates were held by English law.121 Wentworth orchestrated a series of senior 
prerogative courts (the court of castle chamber, court of wards, commission for defective 
titles, court of high commission) to effect this massive increase in royal wealth and power; 
and Jon Crawford, although concerned to stress the long-term development of these courts, 
nevertheless wrote that Wentworth distorted these organs of prerogative justice into 
instruments of “despotism.”122 Dougal Shaw has explained how Wentworth expressed this 
program through political ritual. Vice-regal ceremonies more elaborate than Dublin had ever 
seen demanded the submission of noble bodies as well as of noble wills and fortunes.123  
Moreover, Anthony Milton has argued that there was an absolutist tenor to the private 
correspondence between Wentworth, Charles I, and the king’s other ministers; the practical 
expression of this tenor was Wentworth’s separation of supply from the redress of grievance 
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in his Irish Parliament of 1634-5, and his attempt to do the same in the English Parliament of 
1640. Just as one did not bargain with God, so one did not bargain with the king. 124 
Wentworth told both his Privy Council in April 1634, and then both Houses on the opening 
day of the Irish Parliament in July 1634, that parliaments had a duty of obedience to their 
monarch, and that obedient parliaments should trust in the king’s gracious reward.  There was 
no question of parliament having any right in policy or administration.125 In response to 
Milton’s argument, Kevin Sharpe objected that Wentworth “wrote no new theory of state.”126 
Perhaps this was true of Wentworth, but it was not true of Sir George Radcliffe, Wentworth’s 
most trusted servant.127 
Probably about the same time that he asked Ussher to publish a defense of royal 
power in the summer of 1639, Radcliffe composed his own treatise on the subject. Radcliffe’s 
talents were prodigious. Educated at University College, Oxford, and Gray’s Inn, he was as 
adept at deriving effective legal arguments from obscure points of medieval ecclesiastical 
history (such as Wentworth successfully urged against the earl of Cork), as at election 
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management.128 The three-page treatise in question, “Of the originall of Government,” is 
bound up with other documents that passed through Ussher’s hands, and carries Ussher’s 
attribution to “Sir George Radcliffe” on the first page.129 
Radcliffe began by arguing that God had first granted dominion, a type of moral 
power, to Cain (Genesis 4:7). This grant was the first distinction between governors and 
subjects, and meant that future instructions from governor to subject were not just rules 
backed by force, but laws binding in conscience. God’s grant to the governor included the 
power to punish disobedience with the sword. Radcliffe then reviewed the divinely ordained 
power of government as it operated in three kinds of human society. In domestic society, the 
father of the family held power over his wife, children, and servants. In ecclesiastical society, 
the “Fathers of the Church” held power over the lower clerical orders. And in political 
society, the pater patriae (father of the fatherland) held a paternal power over his good 
subjects, and a lordly (‘dominicall’) power over those servi poenis (slaves for reason of 
punishment) who deserved death. That both domestic and ecclesiastical power were directly 
from God, Radcliffe wrote, was uncontroversial; it was political power that was the problem. 
Most agreed that it was from God in some sense, and here Radcliffe quoted all the usual 
proof texts. But some thought, Radcliffe wrote, “that the power of government, is originally 
and radically in the people; and from them by common consent desired to one or more, and 
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so the people’s consent, ratified by God’s ordinances or approbation, is thought to be the 
adaequaete cause of the authoritie of the Magistrate.” This could not be right, he insisted, 
because the texts which proved God’s institution clearly meant that God did more than 
merely approve a human institution.130 
Radcliffe offered seven further reasons why the power of government could not lie 
originally in the people. Of these, the most important were the third, fifth, and seventh. 
Radcliffe’s third reason was that magistracy required excellent wisdom and other virtues, but 
many of the people were servi a natura (slaves by nature), too stupid to own either themselves 
or any property.131 Not naturally qualified for government, they could have no natural right to 
government. Radcliffe’s fifth reason was that there was no evidence that God ever granted 
political power to any people or community, rather than to an individual. His seventh reason 
was that no human might take his or her own life, and neither did groups of humans have the 
power to take a life, but magistrates might justly kill even thieves. This “power of the sword” 
cannot have been communicated other than immediately from God.132   
While the modern reader will be struck by the Aristotelian flourishes to his arguments 
(especially natural slavery), Radcliffe felt obliged to admit to his contemporary readers that 
the arguments he advanced (especially the identity of domestic and political power) could not 
be reconciled with Aristotle’s Politics. But Aristotle, Radcliffe continued, was a heathen and 
so he was ignorant of the divine institution of political power; the Greek’s views should be 
placed to one side. This account of government was also very different, Radcliffe wrote, to 
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those of the scholastics and modern Catholic divines. The modern Catholics to whom 
Radcliffe referred included Jesuit theologians like Francisco Suárez who argued that political 
power flowed from nature, rather than being the result of God’s special action separate from 
creation.133 Radcliffe insisted that the Catholics argued this only because either they preferred 
Aristotle to St Paul, or because they wished to advance spiritual monarchy (the power of the 
pope) and so they deprecated political monarchy. It thus served these Catholics, Radcliffe 
explained, to judge that spiritual monarchy was divine “both in respect of the Institution and 
object” but that the political was only human in both institution and object.134 
Finally, Radcliffe wrote, his theory of government was very different to that of “our 
Protestant divines beyond seas” who had lived in states where the magistrate was opposed to 
Protestantism and so favored advancing the people’s power in order to further the 
Reformation. According to Radcliffe, these divines argued that as God had not recently 
chosen to nominate magistrates directly (as in the Old Testament), so he acted through the 
people as a medium, which gave the people a causal role in the institution of magistrates. 
This argument was not quite the same as the one made by the Catholics, as it preserved the 
fundamentally divine character of magisterial power. Radcliffe responded by writing that 
while the proximate cause might be the people, the first cause was always God: peoples 
might “designe this man or that Stock to be king” during a vacancy, the nature and power of 
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the office of king was established by God, the purpose of which was to sustain “humane 
societies in Peace and order.”135  
Either because the treatise remained unfinished or to be discrete, Radcliffe did not 
take the final step and draw the conclusion that Charles I’s power was absolute, free of 
human control. But no other conclusion could be coherent. Radcliffe’s insistence of the 
necessity of the highest form of obedience for royal authority, the patriarchal nature of that 
authority, and his attacks on both Catholic and Protestant doctrines of limited monarchy and 
just resistance left absolute monarchy as the only alternative. 
The similarities between Radcliffe’s theory and that of Archbishop Ussher are 
striking. Both theories posited a direct divine ordination for a political power which was 
patriarchal in nature, though Radcliffe was much more frank than Ussher in explaining the 
incompatibility of this with Aristotelian politics. Both saw the moment of divine institution 
occurring when God addressed Cain at Genesis 4.7, and both gave prominent place to the ius 
gladii in their explanation of what that divine institution meant. Nevertheless, Radcliffe did 
not address the lesser magistrate theory of resistance at all, whereas for Ussher it was a 
constant, nagging problem. The argument that Radcliffe attributed to continental Protestants 
does not seem very much like that employed by early Covenanters like Henderson. Ussher’s 
arguments were much more precise: he addressed himself to the fountain-head of Calvinist 
resistance theory; he did not argue that Presbyterians and Jesuits were all the same; and he 
took particular care over the theory of resistance that granted an independent divine right to 
lesser magistrates. These targets, arguments, and anxieties mark Ussher’s political theory as a 
Calvinist one. Fundamentally however, and despite Ussher’s disagreement with the Laudian 
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religious policies of the vice-regal court, he was at one with the court on the superiority of 
royal power over any human law.  
 
Conclusion 
 
James Ussher was not just a Calvinist whose absolutism was a functional response to a series 
of threats from Catholics and anti-episcopal Protestants. Rather, there was a Reformed 
Orthodox quality to his theory of royal power. Despite Ussher’s thorough education in 
Aristotelian ethics and politics there was no Aristotelian eudaimonism left in his mature 
political theory. Further research may reveal that this antipathy to eudaimonism was common 
to Calvinists, or at least very frequent among them, which might explain the positive 
reception that the early Enlightenment received in Calvinist countries, complementing Philip 
Gorski’s neo-Weberian thesis on the importance of Calvinism to state formation in early 
modern Europe.136  In The Power Communicated by God to the Prince, Ussher adopted a yet 
more minimalist vision of human life, questioning the human ability to perceive natural law 
in a manner reminiscent of Lambert Daneau. Overall, this anti-Aristotelianism was the first 
aspect of the Calvinist quality to his political theory. Ussher’s commitment to the essence of 
Reformed orthodox political theory, the divine institution of power, was fundamental. This 
left him in some difficulty when facing the problem of whether lesser magistrates were 
obliged to resist tyrants. Ussher’s slow retreat from the position that inferior magistrates 
received their ius gladii directly from God (which implied that they were obliged to resist 
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tyranny), and his remarkable obfuscation of the matter in 1640, betrayed a distinctly Calvinist 
anxiety: this is the second aspect of the Calvinist quality to his political theory.  
Ussher’s absolutism did not isolate him in 1630s Dublin: it is now clear that along 
with the absolutist political practice pursued by Strafford and identified by historians like 
Kearney, Clarke, and Crawford, the vice-regal court was also characterized by absolutist 
political theory. Radcliffe might only have written his views down in 1639; but Ussher, his 
fellow privy-councilor, had been preaching a patriarchal, Bodinian absolutism since 1634. 
Ussher’s theory, Radcliffe’s theory, and Strafford’s policy and ceremony marched in step and 
reinforced one another: this amounts to an absolutist discourse of government in Dublin in 
the 1630s. Absolutists like these were perhaps a minority in early Stuart Britain and Ireland; 
but this particular group, at least, were an important minority. Strafford’s words and deeds in 
Ireland were a significant solvent of trust between crown and subject in Scotland and 
England.137 This is not to restore Stuart absolutism as a major cause of civil war, but 
absolutism’s importance as a conceptual tool for a government that failed must no longer be 
in doubt. 
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